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Davidson v. Davidson, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 71 (Sept. 29, 2016)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON ENFORCING DIVORCE
DECREES
Summary
The Court determined that: (1) the six-year statute of limitations in NRS 11.190(1)(a)
applies to claims for enforcement of a property distribution provision in a divorce decree; and (2)
the statute of limitations period in an action on a divorce decree commences “from the last
transaction or the last item charged or last credit given.”
Background
In 2006, Dawnette and Christopher Davidson divorced. Their divorce decree required
Dawnette to release her rights in the marital residence via quitclaim deed. In return, Christopher
would pay Dawnette one-half of the equity in the marital residence.
About two weeks after the divorce, Dawnette and Christopher reconciled. Though never
remarrying, they lived together in the marital residence until 2011. Dawnette executed the
quitclaim deed in 2006. Christopher claimed he paid Dawnette half of the equity, but she denied
ever receiving it.
In 2014, Dawnette filed a motion to enforce the divorce decree. Christopher argued that
the statute of limitations barred Dawnette’s claim. Dawnette responded that the statute of
limitations had not yet begun to run because the decree did not provide a deadline by which
Christopher needed to tender payment. The district court concluded Dawnette’s claim was
untimely after holding that that an action to enforce a divorce decree must be commenced within
six years pursuant to NRS 11.190(1)(a). Dawnette appealed.
Discussion
Whether the family division of the district court may enforce its decrees without time limitations
Except for child support orders, Nevada laws does not exclude the district court’s family
division from the limitations period in NRS 11.190(1)(a). Dawnette argued that NRS 125.240
allows the family division of the district court to enforce its decrees and judgments without any
time limitations. Under NRS 125.240, the family division can enforce its orders in separate
maintenance actions without any time limitations. Dawnette reasoned that this absence of time
limitations in separate maintenance actions applied because NRS 125.250 states that all the
proceedings in a separate maintenance case must mirror divorce proceedings as much as
possible.
The Court rejected Dawnette’s argument for two reasons: (1) even though separate
maintenance proceedings generally must mirror divorce proceedings, divorce proceedings are
not required to mirror maintenance proceedings; and (2) the Nevada Legislature did not intend to
eliminate the statute of limitations for enforcement of all family division orders. If the Nevada
Legislature really intended to eliminate the statute of limitations for enforcement of all family
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division orders, then it would have granted specific authority like in NRS 125B.050, which
specifically disregards time limits to enforce child support orders. Similarly, NRS 125.150(3)
also sets a limitations period for post-judgment motions to adjudicate omitted assets in divorce,
annulment, or separate maintenance cases. Thus, there is no reason to create a new rule that
excludes property distribution provisions in divorce decrees from the six-year statute of
limitations in NRS 11.190(1)(a).
Whether the statute of limitations has expired for Dawnette’s action
Dawnette’s action was time barred because the statute of limitations expired in 2012.
Dawnette argued that because the decree did not include a deadline, and because it was not
reasonable for her to demand payment while still living in the marital residence, that the statute
of limitations did not begin to run until the parties’ post-decree separation in 2011. The Court
rejected this argument and held that the statute of limitations began to run once there was
“evidence of indebtedness.” Under NRS 11.200, and Borden v. Clow2, “evidence of
indebtedness” existed once Dawnette delivered the quitclaim deed to Christopher in 2006.
Accordingly, NRS 11.190(1)(a)’s six-year statute of limitations period began running in 2006
and expired in 2012. Therefore, Dawnette’s 2014 claim was untimely.
Conclusion
The six-year statute of limitations in NRS 11.190(1)(a) applied to Dawnette’s motion to
enforce the property distribution provision of her divorce decree. Furthermore, the statute of
limitations began running when Dawnette delivered the quitclaim deed to Christopher in 2006.
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